The advent of nuclear weapons is clearly the single most important development which post-war balance of power thinking has had to accommodate.
by no means innocent of the implications for western policy, given that a number of the cases studied bear a resemblance to the standard NATO nightmare and illuminate a series of flaws in deterrence as an approach to crisis management. However, for precisely the same reason that the more abstract deterrence theorists considered their abstraction warranted because of the sheer novelty of the situation, there is inevitably a sense that the conclusions derived from case studies must inevitably be limited because we have not yet experienced that ultimate test which is at the heart of the policy debate. So while it would be unfair to suggest that the thorough research has lacked influence it has not, as it were, 'deterred' the NATO establishment from continuing to phrase their strategic pronouncements in terms of deterrence. It is not my intention in this article to challenge the particular conclusions on deterrence as analytical theory and strategic practice which have been developed in recent years by a number of scholars. They contain much insight and good sense. My real concern is with the analytical focus on deterrence as an immediate problem of crisis management rather than as a more general feature of international relations. This tendency is also exhibited in some contributions to the policy debate. This article explores the concept of general deterrence, which is the closest deterrence theory comes to traditional balance of power notions. Although this concept was first offered over a decade ago, it has not been given the attention that it deserves by the strategic studies community.
The concept of deterrence
The early use of the term deterrence in twentieth century strategic thinking followed closely the Latin root?d?terre or to frighten from or away. The word has seemed most appropriate when being used to convey the idea of scaring off a potential aggressor through threats of consequential pain. However, once a more precise formulation is attempted then the concept moves away from its root. Consider for example the definition employed by George and Smoke:
Deterrence is simply the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.5
Such a formulation covers a wide range of strategic relationships. Morgan sees the challenge to general deterrence coming less from the logic of a particular strategy required to sustain it, than from its possible inability to cope with turbulence within the international system of the sort that has produced wars in the past, and in particular political changes which create dissatisfaction with the estab lished international order. General deterrence becomes frail at times of revolutionary change or when the international order appears illegitimate in the eyes of rising states. History is therefore full of cases in which general deterrence, in the guise of a balance of power, has broken down. However, it has yet to do so when the balance is based on nuclear power, so the relevance of the pre-nuclear cases remains unclear. The issue is important: a move from general to immediate deterrence means that one form of deterrence has already broken down. The uncertainties and pressures of war cast doubt on attempts to construct doctrines for nuclear use and so in turn make it extremely difficult to rely on such doctrines as a basis for reliable deterrent threats. By the same token they give sufficient credibility to deterrence based on the prospect suggests that merely to declare alliance is not enough, and that policy-makers make distinctions about the risks they are prepared to run, and the resources they are prepared to devote, to different regions of the world. Western Europe, Japan and South Korea rate higher than other regions. This is to some extent for historical and institutional reasons as much as the result of an analysis of objective interests. The argument became muddied by such notions as the 'interdependence of commitments', which suggested that it was vital to meet any communist challenge to the friends of the United States (neither of which were necessarily precisely defined) in order that there be no doubt as to American resolve. Although this argument occasionally resurfaces, it lost much of its force as a result of the Vietnam war. There is an awareness of the limits to which one can extend deterrence. These limits are less a function of the strategic balance itself (especially since the United States lost any semblance of superiority) and more of a definition of vital interests.
The military postures adopted by the major powers are hardly irrelevant, but they are still only one of a number of factors which shape the current security system. At times of immediate deterrence these postures become much more important. Then they have to be fashioned carefully with regard to political positions. The hypo thetical problem at the heart of the debate on giving credibility to deterrent threats has not yet become critical in practice because the political context has not obliged political leaders to address the stark choices posed.
The extension of general deterrence may require little more than acknowledging the possibility of becoming caught up in a total war as a result of commitments made to another country. 
